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Abstract—This paper proposes to develop a network pheno-
typing mechanism based on network resource usage analysis
and identify abnormal network traffic. The network phenotyping
may use different metrics in the cyber physical system (CPS),
including resource and network usage monitoring, physical state
estimation. The set of devices will collectively decide a holistic
view of the entire system through advanced image processing
and machine learning methods. In this paper, we choose the
network traffic pattern as a study case to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed method, while the methodology
may similarly apply to classification and anomaly detection
based on other resource metrics. We apply image processing
and machine learning on the network resource usage to extract
and recognize communication patterns. The phenotype method is
experimented on four real-world decentralized applications. With
proper length of sampled continuous network resource usage,
the overall recognition accuracy is about 99%. Additionally, the
recognition error is used to detect the anomaly network traffic.
We simulate the anomaly network resource usage that equals
to 10%, 20% and 30% of the normal network resource usage.
The experiment results show the proposed anomaly detection
method is efficient in detecting each intensity of anomaly network
resource usage.
Index Terms—Network resource usage patterns, image pro-
cessing, machine learning, anomaly detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the trending of cyber physical system (CPS),computing and connectivity have been present in every
aspect of human lives [1]. Interconnected devices in a network
cooperate in the distribution of computing in wireless network,
facilitating the decentralized applications, such as seismic
monitoring and industry control [2]. However, due to the
restricted computing ability and energy consummation limi-
tation, complicated cryptography could not be implemented
on devices of low hardware configuration in CPS. Besides,
the bugs of software, operating systems and firmwares that
running on them lead them to be vulnerable [3]. Malwares
like Stunex [4] and Duqu [5] have caused a lot of concerns.
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Thus, how to ascertain the devices of a CPS are trustworthy
is becoming an important and open question.
To mitigate increasing attacks targeting CPS devices, a lot
of countermeasures has been proposed. Remote attestation is
an efficient to verify the security of the individual CPS devices
and has been a hot research topic. The main idea of remote
attestation is the system management sends attest requests
to the remote devices and make decisions according to the
received security reports from the devices. Generally speak-
ing, remote attestation could be sorted into three categories:
software-based, hardware-based and hybrid. Software-based
methods [6] calculate the checksum of memory and essentially
register and expect a time-limited response for trustworthy de-
vices without the help of additional hardware. Hardware-based
methods depend on secure hardware such as TPM [7] and
TrustZone [8] to provide secure execution environment. The
hybrid methods require the minimal collection of hardware and
software components that result in secure remote attestation
[9], [10], [11], [12]. However, most existing methods are not
scalable for a large number of devices and could only measure
static integrity.
Resource usage analysis is another approach to verify the
trustworthiness of CPS devices. The usage of resources such as
CPU, memory and network of the devices is used in resources
usage methods. The inside states of devices could thus be
inferred, which is useful for system management. [13], [14]
analyzed the user behaviors by tracking the energy consump-
tions. However, they are only targeting individual device. [15],
[16] proposed to monitor HPC systems by collecting detailed
resource usage information to detect anomalous behaviors.
But they didn’t consider the co-occurrence of resources usage
among the HPCs. Besides, collecting and transmitting detailed
information might not be practical for devices of low hardware
configuration which have limited computing and bandwidth
resources. In a CPS system, interconnected devices work to-
gether in running decentralized applications. The devices will
collectively decide a holistic view of the entire system Unlike
desktop computers or servers, a CPS only runs very limited
number of applications simultaneously. Thus, the resource
usage patterns of a CPS could be characterized by analysis
the resource usage patterns of decentralized applications that
would run on the CPS devices.
Machine learning methods are often combined with re-
source usage analysis for behavior monitoring of CPS devices
[13], [15], [16], [17]. Machine learning tasks are typically
classified into two broad categories: supervised learning and
unsupervised learning. Supervised learning is presented with
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example inputs and their desired outputs and the goal is to
learn a general rule that maps inputs to outputs. However,
unsupervised learning is given no labels for the inputs and
the goal is to discover the hidden patterns of the inputs. [13]
used regression, a supervised learning method, to predict the
energy consumption of cellphones. [17] used binary decision
tree, also a supervised learning method, to classify the the
behaviors of devices.
In this paper, we choose the network traffic pattern as
a study case to demonstrate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method, while the methodology may similarly apply to
classification and anomaly detection based on other resource
metrics. We first apply texture feature analysis to extract the
spatial information of the network resource usage of the CPS
devices a time point. Then we study the temporal information
of the extracted texture features in time series. The spatial
and temporal features together of the network resource usage
determine the communication patterns of the CPS network.
At last, a supervised learning method, k-NN classification, is
used to classify and recognize the communication patterns.
The phenotype method is experimented on four real-world
decentralized applications. With proper length of sampled
continuous network resource usage, the overall classification
accuracy is about 99%. Additionally, the classification error
is used to detect the anomaly network resource usage. We
simulate the anomaly network resource usage that equals to
10%, 20% and 30% of the normal network resource usage.
The experiment results show the proposed anomaly detection
method is efficient in detecting each intensity of anomaly
network resource usage.
The contributions of this work are summarized below:
• To our best knowledge, this work is the first to phenotype
a whole CPS network instead of individual devices.
• This work presents a novel method to characterize the
network resource usage of four real-work decentralized
applications based on image processing and machine
learning.
• This work also propose a straightforward and efficient
method to detect abnormal network resource usage of
CPS network.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
shows the preliminaries of the proposed approaches. Section
III proposes the method to phenotype the CPS network base
on network resource usage analysis and the method to detect
anomaly network traffic. Section IV shows and discusses the
experiment results. Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
Many CPS use a cloud to visualize and analyze data
collected from the CPS devices, as shown in Fig. 1. System
management is provided with information about the states of
all the CPS devices for security operation, such as shutting
down or restarting the CPS network because of the detected
abnormal behaviors.
In this model, the system management is provided with
real-time network resource usage information through the
Device 1
Device 8
Device
10
Device 2
Device 5
Device 6
Cloud
Cyber physical 
system devices
System 
Management
Device 9
Device N
Device 3 Device 7
Device 4
Fig. 1: Cyber physical system
Fig. 2: An example cyber physical system network consisting
of 100 devices
cloud. From the perspective of sensors, the network resource
usage application or process locally running on every CPS
device works as a sensor, which monitoring the network
resource usage of it. The set of sensors collectively decide
a holistic view of the whole CPS network. The CPS devices
might be equipped with heterogeneous hardware and software
configuration and those devices are interconnected. However,
generally, those devices are resource-constrained and only very
limited number of applications run on the CPS at the same
time. The applications running on the CPS are decentralized
and the devices are scheduled to collect data from their built-in
sensors or transfer/receive data for their neighboring devices.
According to the different applications running on the CPS,
the CPS devices present application-specific communication
feature in when to transfer/receive data and the size of data
that are transferred/received. Hence, we propose to phenotype
the CPS network by analyze the communication feature of the
applications that would run on the CPS.
As as Fig. 2, there are 100 devices in an example CPS
network. Those devices are interconnected with each other
directly or indirectly wirelessly. The discussion of the rest of
the paper is based on this example CPS network. Note that the
proposed phenotype method and anomaly detection method is
not depend on the topology of the CPS network.
B. Threat Model
Denial of service (DoS) attack and botnet attack are two
common attacks against CPS network [18]. A DoS attack
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could even drain the limited battery life and computational
capabilities of the CPS devices, which could cause them to
be slow to response to other devices. A heavy DoS attack
could lead the devices to be completely irresponsible, which
is trivial to detect. A botnet attack is to control the CPS
devices to carry out distributed Dos attacks to remote target
servers. An aggressive botnet attack could consume a lot
of network resource and cause the applications running on
the CPS network to progress very slowly or halt, which is
also conspicuous to the system management. Hence, in this
paper, we consider a more sophisticated attack that brings in
additional network traffic among the CPS devices but would
not affect the progress of the applications running on the CPS
network. The attack could be either a light DoS attack or light
botnet attack. Both the attacks introduce anomaly network
traffic to the CPS network.
C. Definitions
For the ease of discussion, let’s introduce the definitions for
this paper.
Definition 1: Network throughput, the real-time sum of
speeds of transferring and sending data of a CPS device;
Definition 2: Communication matrix, a matrix comprised
of the network throughput of all the CPS device at a time;
Definition 3: Communication picture, a picture created by
visualizing a communication picture;
Definition 4: Texture feature snippet, a slice of the time-
series texture features;
Definition 5: Coefficient matrix, each element of which is
the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between two time-series
texture feature of a texture feature snippet.
Definition 6: Communication pattern, partial elements of
a coefficient matrix.
III. PHENOTYPING THE CPS NETWORK AND DETECTING
ANOMALY NETWORK TRAFFIC
Fig. 2 shows that the 100 interconnected devices in the
example CPS network. The communication between every
device and other devices is scheduled by the decentralized
applications running on the CPS network. Each application
has its own unique schedule. Based on this observation, we
propose to phenotype the CPS network by analyzing the
network traffic of the decentralized applications running on
it.
A. Spatial analysis of the communication image
By reading the network throughput of every device in Fig.
2 and organize them as the devices are ordered in the figure,
we get an communication image by visualizing the network
throughput of every device as a pixel. As shown in Fig. 3,
an example communication image of CPS network in Fig. 2.
There are 100 pixels in the figure and x stands for the xth row
of the picture and y stands for the yth column of the picture.
p(x, y), the value of the xth row and yth column pixel, is the
network throughput of the (10 ∗ x+ y)th device. Note that if
the topology of the CPS network is squared as that in Fig.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Y
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
X
Fig. 3: An example communication image of the example
cyber physical system network
2, we could still get a rectangular communication picture by
padding with some zero-value pixels, which would not affect
the following proposed methods.
Each communication image represents the network resource
usage of the whole CPS network at a time sample. According
to the different applications running on it at that time, the
corresponding communication images are different. In this
paper, we utilize texture feature analysis [19], [20], [21] on
the communication images. Texture analysis is an important
element of human vision and has been apply to problems of
texture classification, discrimination and segmentation [19].
According to [22], there are many different kinds of texture
features.
In this paper, we propose to transform the communica-
tion image into multiple single values to reduce computing
complexity. Hence we choose the statistics based feature
extraction methods. Statistics based feature extraction methods
are classified into three classes: first-order statistics, second-
order statistics and higher-order statistics. First-order statistics
only consider the individual pixels. Second-order statistics de-
pend on the co-occurrence of neighboring pixels. Higher-order
statistics are to deal with nonlinearities and non-Gaussianity. In
our case, the interconnected devices of the CPS network work
collaboratively so that the network throughput of neighboring
devices are related to each other. Hence, this paper chooses
GLCM (gray level co-occurrence matrix) texture features,
the most popular second-order statistical texture features. We
select five GLCM texture features: energy, entropy, contrast,
IDM (Inverse Difference Moment) and DM (Directional Mo-
ment) [22]. To get the GLCM texture features, we need to first
convert the communication images into GLCM.
1) Convert the communication images into GLCM: Shown
as in Table I are the corresponding intensity (gray-level) values
of every pixel of Fig. 2. Note that we normalize the network
throughput of the devices to be within the range of 0 to 4 for
the ease of demonstrating how to convert the communication
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image into GLCM. Let’s denote the length of the range as L
and in this example L equals to 5.
Table II is the resultant GLCM. i and j stand for the
ith row and jth column of the GLCM matrix, respectively.
Each element #(i, j) in the GLCM is the sum of the num-
ber of times that the pixel with value i occurred in the
specified spatial relationship to a pixel with value j in the
communication image [23]. There are four different kinds of
relationship between two adjacent pixels: horizontal, vertical,
positive diagonal and anti-diagonal, as shown in Fig. 4a, 4b,
4c and 4d, respectively. Take the horizontal relationship for
example: as shown in Table I, all the horizontal adjacent pixel
pairs that is (1,2) are circled. Hence it is easy to see #(1, 2),
circled in Table Table II, equals to 6.
TABLE I: Intensity values of the example communication
image.
1 3 2 0 2 4 1 2 1 0
4 1 2 2 4 1 1 0 1 2
1 3 2 0 4 2 3 3 1 3
4 2 2 3 3 4 2 4 3 3
1 3 1 4 1 4 2 1 3 1
1 0 1 0 1 3 2 4 3 1
0 4 2 4 1 4 3 1 0 3
3 3 1 0 0 3 2 4 3 2
1 3 3 3 0 1 2 2 4 2
0 3 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 1
1 2 0 3 2 1 2 1 3 4
TABLE II: GLCM (co-occurrence matrix) of the example
communication image
i
j 0 1 2 3 4
0 #(0,0) #(0,1) #(0,2) #(0,3) #(0,4)
1 #(1,0) #(1,1) #(1,2) #(1,3) #(1,4)
2 #(2,0) #(2,1) #(2,2) #(2,3) #(2,4)
3 #(3,0) #(3,1) #(3,2) #(3,3) #(3,4)
4 #(4,0) #(4,1) #(4,2) #(4,3) #(4,4)
i j
(a) Horizontal
i
j
(b) Vertical
i
j
(c) Positive diag-
onal
i
j
(d) Anti-diagonal
Fig. 4: Four different adjacent relationship between two pixels
with value i and j, respectively.
As we can see, a GLCM is a L by L matrix. The larger L is,
more information of the communication picture is preserved
in the GLCM. However, larger L brings in more computing
complexity.
2) Calculate GLCM texture features: As discussed in pre-
vious section, we can get four GLCMs from a communication
picture from the perspectives of four different adjacent rela-
tionship between two pixels in the communication picture. For
each GLCM, we apply below five equations [22].
Energy:
Energy =
√√√√ L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
M2(i, j). (1)
Entropy:
Entropy =
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
M(i, j)(− ln(M(i, j))). (2)
Contrast:
Contrast =
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
(i− j)2M(i, j). (3)
IDM (Inverse Difference Moment):
IDM =
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
1
1 + (i− j)2M(i, j). (4)
DM (Directional Moment):
DM =
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
|i− j|M(i, j). (5)
Energy, entropy, contrast, IDM and DM measure the inten-
sity of pixel pair repetitions, the randomness of pixels, the
extent of a pixel and its neighbors, local homogeneity of the
communication image and alignment of it in terms of the
angle, respectively.
Let’s denote the number of GLCM texture features Nf we
get from one communication picture. For each GLCM from the
perspective of one adjacent relationship between two pixel, we
get 5 GLCM texture features. Thus, we get 5∗4 = 20 GLCM
texture features in total, i.e. Nf = 20.
B. Temporal analysis of GLCM texture features
We have previously mentioned that each communication
image stands for the network resource usage of the CPS
network at a time sample. The GLCM texture features of
a single communication are not enough to represent the
application running on the CPS devices. We consider the
communication feature as the transition of the texture features,
i.e., the communicate feature is showed by both the Nf texture
feature values and the time-series trends of them.
As shown in Fig. 5, we present the time-series trends of
the texture feature values of an example application for only
one adjacent relationship between two pixels 1. The horizontal
axis is time and the vertical axis is texture feature value. We
1In order to show all the five curves in one picture, we normalize the Energy
and Entropy by timing them with 105.
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Fig. 5: Time-series trends of texture feature values
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Fig. 6: Slicing the time-series texture feature trends into texture
feature snippets
record the example application every second 2 for 300 seconds,
starting about 50 seconds before the application starts and
around 50 seconds after it ends. The example application lasts
around 200 seconds. The value of the points the Nf curves go
through and the time-series trends of the curves representing
the communication features of the example application.
1) Texture feature snippets: In order to extract more com-
munication features of one decentralized application ruining
on the interconnected CPS network, we slice the time-series
texture feature trends into texture feature snippets by using a
sliding window, as shown in Fig. 6.
Assume the running time of an application is T seconds and
the communication images are recorded every second. Assume
the size of the sliding window is TS , then every texture feature
snippet consists of Nf ∗TS texture feature values. The sliding
window move once a second, hence we have T − TS + 1
snippets for this application.
2) Coefficient matrix: We observe that each time the CPS
network runs a certain application, all the time-series texture
feature trends are stochastic. However, the similarities between
each two time-series texture feature trends are stable. Hence
we propose to use the similarities between each two time-
series texture feature trends as the communication patterns.
Pearson Correlation Coefficient [24] is common method to
calculate the similarity of two vectors. As shown in Equation
2The communication images are recorded every second throughout this
paper.
6, x and y are two time-series texture features, ρ(x, y) is the
Pearson Correlation Coefficient between x and y.
ρ(x, y) =
n
N∑
i=1
xiyi −
N∑
i=1
xi
N∑
i=1
yi√
(n
N∑
i=1
xi2 −
N∑
i=1
xi
2
)(n
N∑
i=1
yi2 −
N∑
i=1
yi
2
)
(6)
Let’s denote the ith time-series texture feature of the texture
feature snippet as vi. By computing the Pearson Correlation
Coefficient between every two time-series texture feature
trends, we could get a Nf times Nf coefficient matrix as
below:

ρ(f1, f1) ρ(f1, f2) ρ(f1, f3) ... ρ(f1, fNf )
ρ(f2, f1) ρ(f2, f2) ρ(f2, f3) ... ρ(f2, fNf )
... ... ... ... ...
ρ(fNf , f1) ρ(fNf , f2) ρ(fNf , f3) ... ρ(fNf , fNf )

The coefficient matrix is a symmetric matrix and all of the
elements in the diagonal line, ρ(fi, fi) (i ∈ [1, Nf ]), equal
1. Thus we could use partial elements ρ(fi, fj) (i, j ∈ [1, Nf ]
and i 6= j) to represent the coefficient matrix. The size-reduced
coefficient matrix is comprised of only Nf ∗ (Nf/2 − 1)
elements. We represent the size-reduced coefficient matrix as
the communication pattern. For each application, we have
T − TS +1 communication patterns. Note that computing the
communication patterns from the communication images does
not depend on the number of devices in the CPS network.
Hence the proposed phenotyping method is scalable.
C. Classification of the communication patterns
1) Communication pattern labeling: We denote NA as
the number of different applications that would run on the
CPS network. For application Ap(p ∈ [1, NA]), we trans-
form the network throughput into communication patterns,
spq (q ∈ [1, Tp − TS + 1] ), and label them as Lp. In
this paper, we use k-NN (k-nearest neighbors algorithm) to
classify the communication patterns. k-NN is a very popular
supervised machine-learning classification method [25]. In
order to further reduce the computing complexity, we perform
principal components analysis on the attributes before training
the k-NN model.
2) Recognition of Communication Patterns: Algorithm 1
shows how to recognize the communication patterns. Firstly,
the algorithm is given a communication pattern under recog-
nition, stest. Then it searches the labeled communication pat-
terns to find k communication patterns with shortest Euclidean
distance with stest and store them in set SetK . The next step
is find the label Lp that labels most communication patterns
in SetK . Label Lp is the result of recognition.
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Algorithm 1 Recognition of a given communication pattern
1: Inputs: a communication pattern stest under recognition;
2: Outputs: The label of application the stest belongs to;
3: Set SetK = {};
4: for each communication pattern spq in the database; do
5: Compute the euclidean distance dpq between stest and
spq;
6: end for
7: Choose k communication patterns with smallest Euclidean
distance with stest and put them in SetK ;
8: Return the label Lp with most communication patterns
that labeled as Lp in SetK ;
D. Anomaly detection
Training the k-NN model must be done under safe environ-
ment, i.e., all the CPS devices are trustworthy. The anomaly
detection period could be done under unsafe environment.
Recollect the threat model in II-B that the attack would not
affect the progress of the applications running on the CPS
network. Since the tasks of the CPS network are scheduled by
the system management, the system management know what
application is running on the CPS network at any time. Once
the network resource usage is compromised, the recognized
application label would be different from expected label by
the system management. Assume the recognition accuracy of
the trained k-NN model for application Ap(p ∈ [1, NA]) is Rp,
we set the accuracy threshold Thp of it as Thp = Rp ∗ θth.
For application Ap in period of anomaly detection, if the
recognition accuracy R
′
p is less than Thp, we consider the
network resource usage of the CPS network as abnormal and
otherwise, we consider it as normal.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section, we study four real-world applications, aggre-
gation, broadcast, consensus and collection. In CPS network,
these four decentralized applications are very popular and they
have different communication styles. In aggregation, each leaf
device sends data to its father devices. The father devices
process the received data and send same-size data to their
father. As to broadcast, starting with root device, data are sent
from father devices to their children devices. For consensus,
each device sends data to its neighbors and calculate received
data and send data and calculate received data again and
again till convergence is reached. The Distributed Gradient
Descent (DGD) is very similar to consensus. Each device do
certain number of iterations of sending data to its neighbor and
calculating received data. The difference is for DGD, each
device is synchronized with its neighboring devices, but for
consensus, each device is asynchronous with its neighboring
devices.
The experiments are based on CORE Simulator. CORE
Simulator is a network emulation tool that uses virtualization
provided by FreeBSD jails, Linux OpenVZ containers, and
Linux namespaces containers [26]. We set up 100 devices on
it, as shown in Fig 2. We run every application on CORE
Simulator for 200 times and the network throughput are
recorded every second. We also run the CORE Simulator with
executing none application as base reference for 200 times
and record the network throughput every second as well. The
normalization range L is empirically set as 9. In order to
shorten the training time of k-NN model, we use principal
component analysis to reduce the dimensions of the feature
data. We choose to preserve 95% of the information of the
communication patterns, reducing the original 210 dimensions
to only 11 dimensions. The running time of these applications
and the average network throughput of every CPS device
throughput the running time of every application are shown
as in Table III.
TABLE III: The information of applications.
Application T (s) Average network throughput (kbps)
Aggregation 195 44.25
Broadcast 195 23.77
Consensus 202 499.04
DGD 242 533.35
Base reference 300 10.20
In our experiment, we randomly choose 80% of the com-
munication patterns of every application as training data and
label them respectively. The rest 20% of the communication
patterns of every application are used to test the accuracy of
the proposed recognition method.
A. Accuracy of proposed method
This section presents the accuracy of the proposed method
charactering the applications running on the CPS network. As
shown in Fig. 7, the horizontal axis strands for the size of the
sliding window TS and the vertical axis stands for recognition
accuracy. As we can see, the proposed method has achieved
high accuracy. When TS is 50s, the recognition accuracy
of the broadcast is 68%, which is lowest among all the
applications. With the TS increasing, the recognition accuracy
of all the applications become higher. When TS increase to
190s 3, the recognition accuracy of all the applications are
higher than 95%. However, TS also controls the granularity of
the communication patterns. Smaller communication patterns
could more details of the feature of the network resource
usage. Hence, we have to compromise between the recognition
accuracy and the granularity of communication patterns.
B. Anomaly detection
In this section, we show our proposed method is capable of
detecting abnormal network traffic. As mentioned in section
II-B, both of DoS attack and botnet attack could bring in
extract network traffic to almost every CPS device. Thus
we simulate the anomaly network traffic by adding different
intensity of random network throughput to every device when
the CPS devices are running. We choose anomaly network
throughput that equal to 10%, 20% and 30% of the normal
average throughput for every application. For each intensity
of anomaly network throughput, We run every application for
3Note that we don’t evaluate the sliding window TS being 200s because
the running time of aggregation and broadcast are 195s, less than 200s.
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Fig. 7: The recognition accuracy of different sizes of the
sliding window
40 times. We set TS as 100s since the trained k-NN model
archives good balance between the recognition accuracy and
the granularity of communication patterns when the TS is
100s. We set the threshold parameter θth as 95%. The results
are shown as in Fig. IV.
TABLE IV: Comparison between threshold recognition accu-
racy and recognition accuracy with anomaly network resource
usage
Aggregation Broadcast Consensus DGD
Normal 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.97
Thresholds 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.92
With 10% anomaly 0.78 0.75 0.53 0.35
With 20% anomaly 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30
With 30% anomaly 0.46 0.25 0.32 0.27
As we can see, for each intensity of anomaly network traffic,
the recognition accuracy of aggregation, broadcast, Consensus
and DGD is evidently lower than the corresponding thresholds,
i.e., the proposed detection method succeeds in detecting the
anomaly network traffic that caused by DoS attack or botnet
attack.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes to develop a network phenotyping
mechanism based on network resource usage patterns and
identify compromised network traffic. The proposed pheno-
typing method is based on transforming the network re-
source usage into time-series texture feature values, thus
the computing complexity is reduced. We also apply both
spatial and temporal analysis of the network resource usage.
The phenotyping method achieves every high accuracy of
recognizing the communication patterns of four real-world
decentralized applications. Additionally, the paper proposes
a detection method to verify whether the network resource
usage of the CPS network is normal. The detection method is
straightforward and efficient. In the future, we plan to combine
the network resource usage with other resource usage to better
phenotype the CPS network. Besides, we only consider one
application is running on the CPS network at a time, which is
not always the case. Hence, we also plan to characterize the
CPS network that multiple applications run on it at the same
time.
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